|
CHI06FA186
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On July 11, 2006, at 0943 eastern daylight time, a Cirrus SR-22, N8163Q, was destroyed when it impacted a tree and terrain
during a go-around after an attempted landing on runway 30 (2,500 feet by 48 feet, asphalt) at the Lee Airport (ANP), Edgewater,
Maryland. The private pilot initially survived the accident and was taken to a hospital, but died about three weeks later
as a result of the injuries sustained during the accident. The 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight departed
the Ocean City Municipal Airport (26N), Ocean City, New Jersey, at 0900 with ANP as the final destination. Visual meteorological
conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. An instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan had been filed.
The route of flight on the IFR flight plan was: SIE, ENO, V268, BAL. The proposed time en route was 45 minutes at a speed
of 165 knots with an en route altitude of 4,000 feet mean sea level (msl).
A witness reported that he observed the airplane enter the airport's landing pattern by entering a 45-degree entry from
the northeast. The witness reported that the airplane crossed runway 30 about mid-field and entered a left downwind leg for
landing on runway 30.
Another witness, who was standing on the ramp of the maintenance hangar at ANP, reported that he heard the pilot make
a radio call over the airport's Unicom frequency stating that he was landing on runway 30. The witness reported that he observed
the airplane over the approach end of the runway at an altitude of 150 - 175 feet above ground level (agl). He reported that
the airplane was "diving for the runway" and was flying on the left side of the runway over the grass between the
taxiway and the runway. The airplane continued to "dive" until it was about one half way down the runway when the
nose of the airplane leveled out at an altitude of about 75 feet agl. He heard the engine noise increase, but not to full
power. He reported that the airplane "banked hard to the left" and that he could see the top of both wings. He lost
sight of the airplane behind a line of trees, and later heard a "thud" followed by another thud.
The same witness reported that the airplane's engine sounded normal with no backfiring or sputtering. He heard a slight
increase of engine power when the nose of the airplane leveled out. He reported that the flaps were partially extended.
A third witness, who was working in his hangar located about mid-field at the airport, reported that he heard the airplane
when it was over the runway. He reported that the airplane sounded like it was "not developing a lot of power" but
was "coasting." Then the airplane powered up "a little bit" and then turned to the left. The witness reported
that he did not see the airplane after the turn, but he heard the engine "miss" or "stop" when it was
over the neighborhood. The witness ran to the accident site when he heard the crash.
Two construction workers, who were working on a house on Lee's Lane which was located about 1/8 of a mile from the accident
site, reported that they heard the airplane as it flew over the house. They described the engine noise as being "extremely
loud" prior to the sound of the airplane impacting the trees.
Numerous witnesses arrived at the accident site located about 100 yards from the third witness's hangar. Fuel was spilling
from both fuel tanks. They removed the seat belt and shoulder harness from the pilot and pulled him from the airplane. An
emergency medical helicopter arrived at the scene and the pilot was flown to a hospital.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
The pilot held a private pilot certificate with single-engine land and instrument ratings. He held a third-class medical
certificate with the following restriction: "Must wear corrective lenses for near and distant vision." The pilot
had a total of 2,746 flight hours. The pilot had received 9.5 hours of initial flight training in the Cirrus SR-22 in April
2004, through the Cirrus Design flight-training program in Duluth, Minnesota. He had a total of 167 hours in the SR-22.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
The airplane was a Cirrus SR-22, serial number 785, manufactured in 2003. The airplane seated four and had a maximum gross
weight of 3,400 pounds. The engine was a 310 horsepower Continental IO-550-N engine. The airplane had an annual maintenance
inspection conducted on May 1, 2006. The airplane had flown approximately 3.8 hours since the last inspection and had a total
time of 391 hours.
METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS
At 0954, the observed surface weather at BWI, located about 14 nautical miles north northwest of ANP, was: winds 220 degrees
at 7 kts, visibility 4 statute miles, haze, temperature 28 degrees Celsius (C), dew point 22 degrees C, altimeter 30.11 inches
of mercury.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION
The airplane impacted an oak tree about 75 feet in height that was located in a residential neighborhood that bordered
the airport property. The airplane wreckage was found in a soybean field that was on the airport property. The coordinates
of the main wreckage were 38 degrees 56.537 minutes north longitude and 076 degrees 34.227 minutes west latitude. There was
no ground fire.
The oak tree exhibited strikes at the top of the tree and three large tree limbs were knocked down in a northerly direction.
The same oak tree also had tree limbs that did not exhibit any damage located to the right and left of the three large limbs
that were knocked down. The airplane's initial point of impact on the ground was about 30 feet from the oak tree on a magnetic
heading of 060 degrees. The descent angle from the oak tree to the initial impact point was about 35 - 40 degrees.
Numerous branches were in the wreckage path between the oak tree and the main wreckage. The initial ground impact point
exhibited a slash through the black dirt that was about 56 inches wide and was consistent with a propeller strike. There was
a depression in the ground that was about 5 feet in length at the initial impact point going toward the main wreckage.
The main wreckage was located about 65 feet from the oak tree. The longitudinal axis of the wreckage was on a 240 magnetic
heading. The engine was found on the right wing of the aircraft next to the cabin, facing aft. The engine remained attached
to the firewall via control cables and hoses. The nose landing gear was separated from the fuselage and was found near the
main wreckage.
The belly and floor of the cockpit forward of the spar tunnel were pushed upwards. The firewall and cockpit instrument
panel were pushed back into the cockpit and were over both front seat bottom cushions. The pilot's seatbelt was found open
but intact. The flap switch was found in the 100% (full down) setting. The fuel selector was set to the right tank.
The left inboard wing section remained attached to the fuselage and exhibited forward edge buckling. The wing root area
from the fuselage outboard to the fresh air inlet was missing pieces of wing skin. The hole left by the missing pieces of
skin contained tree leaves consistent with the trees the aircraft struck during the impact sequence. The main spar exhibited
multiple delaminations along its length. The left flap was separated from one of its hinge points. The left flap outward of
the mid-span hinge buckled in two places and was bent upward. The inboard trailing edge of the flap was buckled forward. A
measurement was taken from the inboard side of the left flap from the forward side of the anti-scuff tape to the wing cove.
The distance measured was approximately 4 inches. The left main landing gear remained attached to the left wing, but was bent
to the left.
The outboard section of the left wing was broken off during the impact sequence at approximately wing station (WS) 132.
The outboard section of the left wing, which included about a 3-foot section of wing, the left aileron, the left wingtip,
and the left strobe, were found in the residential yards that were located south of the oak tree.
The right inboard wing remained attached to the fuselage and exhibited forward edge buckling and had large jagged cuts
with missing sections of wing skin. The main spar exhibited multiple delaminations along its length. The flap on the right
wing separated from two of its three hinge points. The flap was torn and dented along the leading edge with a large upward
buckle just outboard of the mid-span hinge. The outboard section of the right wing was broken at wing station (WS) 132, but
it remained attached to the wing and was found with the main wreckage. The right wingtip was found with the main wreckage.
The right main landing gear was separated from the right wing and was found with the main wreckage. It exhibited bending to
the left.
The empennage separated from the fuselage just forward of the fuselage station (FS) 289 bulkhead, but it remained attached
by the rudder and elevator cables. The horizontal stabilizer was found mostly intact. Both elevators showed impact damage.
The damage to the right elevator was concentrated at the tip. The elevator buckled at the outboard end. The left elevator
showed buckling on the trailing edge side in two places. The left elevator could not be moved up or downward from having been
forced forward into the horizontal stabilizer. The vertical stabilizer had damage to the leading edge on the topside of the
empennage. The rudder separated from the vertical stabilizer and was found lying across the left horizontal stabilizer.
Flight control cable continuity was checked. All cables were traced from the flight controls to their respective attach
points on the flight control surfaces. There were no cable breaks to any of the flight control cables.
The roll and pitch trim actuators were found in approximately the neutral setting. The flap actuator arm had sheared from
the motor housing of the flap actuator but remained attached to the flap torque tube assembly. The flap actuator arm protruded
approximately 1/4 inch from its housing which is consistent with a flap setting of 100% (full down).
The Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) system was found un-deployed. The parachute enclosure cover was found separated
from the aircraft about 10 feet to the left side of the empennage. The activation cable was examined and the CAPS safety pin
was found stowed in the handle and handle holder assembly. The CAPS system was rendered safe on site by cutting the activation
cable at the fuselage station (FS) 222 bulkhead. The components that could pose a danger to personnel were removed and detonated
or burned.
A fuel sample was taken from the left wing as the airplane was recovered. The fuel sample was light blue in color with
no apparent contamination.
The compact flash card was removed from the multi-function display (MFD) and sent to Cirrus Design for downloading of
the engine monitoring data by Avidyne Corporation technicians.
The engine inspection revealed that the crankcase was intact and undamaged. The crankshaft rotated freely and engine drive
and valve train continuity was established. "Thumb" compression was obtained on all cylinders. The magnetos remained
attached to the engine and were undamaged. The left and right magneto mounting flanges exhibited mechanical/rotational signatures
(approx. 3 mm) on both sides of the mounting plates (paint scraped away). The left and right magnetos impulse couplings engaged
when the crankshaft was rotated. The ignition harness was intact and a spark was emitted in conjunction with the impulse coupling
actuation from all the upper spark plug leads. The spark plug electrodes exhibited normal operational signatures. The cylinders
were examined with a borescope. No anomalies were observed to the cylinder walls, pistons, or valves. The left and right magneto-to-engine
timing was checked using the timing markings on the crankshaft and found to be 22 degrees. The fuel pump drive coupling was
intact and the pump rotated. The fuel pump, fuel manifold valve, and the throttle valve were sent to engine manufacturer for
testing.
The propeller remained attached to the crankshaft propeller-mounting flange. The flange appeared undamaged. The propeller
spinner exhibited aft crushing. All three-propeller blades remained attached to the propeller hub. The propeller and propeller
governor were shipped to the propeller manufacturer for inspection.
TESTS AND RESEARCH
The MFD compact flash card was sent to Cirrus Design for downloading by Avidyne Corporation technicians with a Federal
Aviation Administration inspector providing oversight. The download of the compact flash card indicated that the last flight
recorded by the MFD was conducted on October 29, 2005. The data concerning the accident flight was not recorded due to memory
size, or was deleted during the "power-up" of the MFD when the download was conducted.
The MFD compact flash card was sent to the Vehicle Recorders Division of the National Transportation Safety Board for
inspection. The inspection confirmed that no information concerning the accident flight was found on the compact flash card.
The fuel system components were bench tested at Teledyne Continental Motors (TCM) on August 29, 2006, with National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) providing oversight. The bench test of the fuel pump and fuel manifold valve indicated that they functioned
through their full range of operation. The throttle and metering assembly, part number 653353-8A1, serial number A03JA091,
was intact and undamaged. The TCM report stated that the first flow test cycle yielded values outside the TCM specifications.
A second test cycle was accomplished where the assembly was adjusted to verify its ability to flow within TCM calibration
specifications. Adjustments to the idle speed and mixture adjustments produced fuel flows within TCM calibration specifications.
The TCM report stated, "During all test phases, the assembly functioned properly through its full range of operation."
The TCM report stated the following:
"The 'Observed' fuel flows and/or pressures are recorded without adjustment (unless noted) of the fuel system component.
... These tests and adjustments are carried out in an environment of controlled fuel supply pressures and calibrated test
equipment.
When engines are installed in aircraft, they are subjected to a different induction system, fuel supply system and operating
environment and may require further adjustments to compensate for these differences. It is these differences that may be present
in the following test bench recorded values and TCM flow/pressure specifications. These tests are conducted to confirm that
the fuel system components function adequately within its' design limitations."
A propeller teardown inspection of the McCauley propeller, model D3A34C443-A, serial number 030617, was conducted at the
McCauley Propeller facility at Wichita, Kansas, on September 21, 2006. The NTSB investigator-in-charge (IIC) provided oversight
of the inspection. The inspection of the propeller revealed that all three blades were still installed in the hub. The retaining
ring attachment and shim packs were all dislodged and the blades were loose. All three blades exhibited normal leading edge
burnishing and paint erosion, but there were no significant leading edge gouges. The number 1 blade (marked blade C on-site)
was straight and undamaged out to the tip. The tip had a rearward bend. The chamber side of the blade had chordwise scoring
in the white paint. The actuating pin was broken by impact damage. The number 2 blade (marked blade A on-site) had a forward
bend at approximately the 12 to 14-inch station. The blade was then straight outboard with decreased pitch twist, and the
last ten inches had tip damage. The actuating pin was intact. The number 3 blade (marked blade B on-site) had an aft bend
at approximately 16 to 18-inch station. The rest of the blade was straight. The actuating pin was intact. The blade angle
at impact was not determined due to impact damage.
The McCauley propeller governor model, number C290D3-R/T23, serial number 030929, was inspected. The governor top cover
was broken and the control shaft and control lever had received impact damage. The teardown of the governor indicated that
the internal parts were intact and exhibited no damage.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The Cirrus Design SR-22 Pilot Operating Handbook (POH), Section 4, Normal Procedures provides procedural information for
"Balked Landings/Go-Around." The POH stated the following:
In a balked landing (go round) climb, disengage autopilot, apply full power, then reduce the flap setting to 50 percent.
If obstacles must be cleared during the go around, climb at 75-80 KIAS with 50 percent flaps. After clearing any obstacles,
retract the flaps and accelerate to the normal flaps up climb speed.
1. Autopilot DISENGAGE
2. Power Lever FULL FORWARD
3. Flaps 50 Percent
4. Airspeed 75-80 KIAS
After clear of obstacles:
5. Flaps UP
The Federal Aviation Administration, Cirrus Design, and Teledyne Continental Motors were parties to the investigation.
The aircraft wreckage was released to Phoenix Aviation.
PDF File
|
